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THE BANKRUPTCY LADDER OF PRIORITIES AND

THE INEQUALITIES OF LIFE
Philip R. Wood QC (Hon)*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The excellent work, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction,1
raises some profound and intriguing questions about the documentation
of some of the world's largest and most important transactions by far and
about what lawyers actually do.
This Article raises a supplementary issue by way of an appendage.2
This issue is whether there ever was a principle of pari passu
distribution on bankruptcy, whatever that means. It concludes that
equality on bankruptcy in the case of corporations at least is a mere
metaphysical illusion and that the reality is rather different.
Bankruptcy law is the profound motivator of commercial and
financial law because, if there is not enough brandy and biscuits on the
raft, the law is at its most ruthless in having to choose who to pay. We
have bankruptcy laws in order to prevent a race to dismember the assets
and in order to achieve an equitable distribution amongst creditors.3 The

* Head, Allen & Overy LLP Global Law Intelligence Unit; Special Global Counsel, Allen
& Overy LLP. Mr. Wood is Visiting Professor in International Financial Law, University of Oxford;
Yorke Distinguished Visiting Fellow, University of Cambridge; Visiting Professor, Queen Mary
College, University of London; and Visiting Professor, London School of Economics and Political
Science.
1. MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION:

BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (forthcoming 2012) (on file with the Hofstra
Law Review).
2. Id. (manuscript at 21).
3. SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL & CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
95TH CONG., REP. ON HEARINGS ON THE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE FOR BANKRUPTCY

CASES 3-4 (Comm. Print 1978) (describing how over 500 separate lawsuits arose during the
administration of a bankruptcy case in New York and the inherent need for speed in these types of
cases as the assets deteriorate in value).
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race to dismember the assets is controlled by stays or freezes-there are
potentially at least half a dozen of these, depending on the jurisdiction.4
The heart and central core of bankruptcy regimes is the bankruptcy
ladder of priorities which determines the hierarchy of claimants on final
liquidation.5 "Even the most cursory examination of bankruptcy
internationally shows that the pari passu rule is nowhere honoured.
Nowhere is there a flat field.",6 On the contrary, creditors are paid
according to a scale of priorities.7 There is an intricate series of steps as
creditors scramble upwards, gasping for more air to escape the "swirling
debt [and] to breathe in the squeezed bubble of oxygen at
tides of rising
8
the top."

II.

WHY THE BANKRUPTCY LADDER IS FUNDAMENTAL

The bankruptcy ladder of priorities is fundamental because:
"

*

*

*
*

4.

It defines basic contract and property rights-rights which

are considered crucial to economic development and which
have been taken into account in insolvency regimes, including
the resolution of banks.
The ladder specifies the risk that the participants take and
facilitates the pricing of the risk, for example, the pricing of
equity capital, which is subordinated to everybody else or the
pricing of a secured loan, which trumps everybody else.
The ladder is the backdrop against which all negotiations
between claimants have to take place because it specifies
where claimants will be positioned in the event of liquidation
if they do not agree. It is the backdrop to corporate
reorganization plans and to bank resolution regimes.
The ladder represents the profound views of a society about
who should survive by being paid and who should be
drowned.
One of the main causes of international legal disharmony on
bankruptcy matters results from different views about the
ladder. Countries do not differ much on such questions as

See 1 PHILIP R. WOOD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE SERIES:

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY § 9-051, at 213-14 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing the stays
within various jurisdictions); Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the
Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 95 (2005) (discussing
stays).
5. 1 WOOD, supra note 4, § 11-001, at 237.
6. Id. (emphasis added).

7. Id.
8. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol40/iss1/9

2

Wood QC (Hon): The Bankruptcy Ladder of Priorities and the Inequalities of Life

2011]

THE BANKRUPTCY LADDER OFPRIORITIES

*

*

*

entry criteria, management, or even the avoidance of
preferences (although they do differ on these matters but not
nearly as much as they disagree about the ladder).
Claimants who are under water typically do not have a vote, at
least in the proceedings themselves. This is because financial
democracies are property democracies. If a claimant does not
have any interest to protect, then the claimant is an outsider
with no involvement and therefore should not be able to
determine outcomes. For example, if the company is
insolvent, this theory generally leads to the conclusion that
shareholders have no vote at all on any reorganization plan.
The same applies to underwater subordinated creditors in the
tiers above shareholders.
There is always a direct cost to somebody in changing the
ladder. The insertion of any class of claimant higher up in the
ladder potentially involves a greater loss to the claimants
lower down. Thus, if retail depositors to a bank are ranked
above ordinary creditors, this may impact upon the interest
rate and maturities of capital-raising bond issues by banks.
Most of the complications in working out priorities result
from the near indecipherability of impact and of weighing up
costs and benefits quantitatively.
The essence of bankruptcy is that the law has to make choices.
Typically, neither of the alternatives is perfect. In the case of
the bankruptcy ladder, there are winners and losers, victors
and victims, because there is not enough to go around. It is
also the case that there is no escape-choices have to be made
and it is these choices that reveal the credentials of a legal
system. The priority ladder reflects the priorities of the legal
culture.

The concept of a ladder of priorities is so potent that there is a
consensus ladder in relation to state insolvency even though state
insolvency is not governed by any mandatory bankruptcy laws. 9 The
result is that the bankruptcy ladder of priorities is directly implicated in
the design of any legal regime for the rescue or liquidation of
corporations and the resolution of banks.

9. See id. § 11-004, at 238; State Insolvency-What Bondholders and Other Creditors
Should Know, ALLEN & OVERY GLOBAL LAW INTELLIGENCE UNIT, 5 (2010), available at
http://www.allenovery.com/AOWeb/binaries/64484.pdf.
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SUMMARY OF THE LADDER

The bankruptcy ladder of priorities usually comprises at least six
main ranks or rungs as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Super-priority creditors;
Priority creditors;
Paripassucreditors;
Subordinated creditors;
Equity shareholders; and
Expropriated creditors. 10

In addition, each of the grand divisions is often sub-divided into
manifold little internal steps, sometimes as many as a dozen or more,
especially in relation to priority post-commencement administrative
costs." So within the main rungs, there are tightly pitched mini-ladders.
The actual amounts involved in each rung of the ladder varies between
banks and corporations, between classes of debtor, and between debtors
in the same generic class.
The typical principal members of each of the above six main classes
of rungs are set out below.
A.

Rung 1: Super-PriorityCreditors

Super-priority creditors are of enormous economic importance.
They are generally paid in full (or up to the amount of their asset) and
are broadly outside the bankruptcy in the sense that they can take assets
out of the debtor's estate for themselves. They are separatists.12
There are usually about eight sub-groups in this main group of
which the most important are:
(1) secured creditors with security interests over collateral,
sometimes tiered into senior and junior tranches by voluntary
agreement, include equivalent title finance substitutes such as
sale and repurchase agreements;
(2) creditors entitled to set-off and to net contracts on a close-out;
and
(3) beneficiaries
under trusts, such as custodianship of
13
securities.

The institutions of security interest, set-off (and netting), and trusts
are major risk mitigants. Notwithstanding this, the international
10.

1 WOOD, supra note 4, § 11-002, at 237 (emphasis added).
11. Id.§11-006,at239.
12. Id. § 11-008, at240.
13. Id.§§ 11-008to-010,-012,-016to-017,at240-44.
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14
reception of these risk mitigants is very different around the world.
One of the most fundamental decisions which policy-makers have to
make is the degree of protection which they confer on these risk
mitigants. In most cases, the amounts involved exceed world gross
domestic product ("GDP") and sometimes a multiple of world GDP, in
terms of daily exposure.' 5
The rationale underlying the status of each super-priority claimant
is detailed. The mainstream view is that the enormous amounts involved,
the protection of the safety of capital-providers, and the capital needs of
economic development support these risk mitigants. 16 Yet there is much
international discord.

B. Rung 2: PriorityCreditors
The most important classes of priority creditors are typically:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

retail depositors and life/pension insurance claimants;
employees for remuneration and benefits up to limits;
unpaid taxes; and
post-commencement administrative claims, including the
important class of post-commencement new financing.17

Most of the controversy is about the size and scope of these priority
claimants and also whether they should rank before or after security
interests. If they rank ahead of unsecured claimants, the increased risk
may have an adverse effect on the cost of paripassu capital. If they rank
ahead of security interests, this will have an impact on the value of
collateral. In practice, major listed corporations and banks do not grant
security except in relation to emergency last resort new moneyl-which
is when it really matters so that the ranking is critical in relation to
corporate reorganizations and bank resolutions.
Most jurisdictions do not give bank depositors a preference.
Examples of countries which do are Republic of Argentina, Australia,
Hong Kong, Japan, Russia, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United States. 19 Outside very simple retail banks, it is thought that
14. Id. § 11-007, at 239.
15. Id. §§ 4-001 to -002, at 75; Philip R. Wood, How to Compare RegulatoryRegimes, 2 CAP.
MARKETS L.J. 332,336 (2007).
16. See I WOOD, supra note 4, §§ 4-001 to -002, 14-006, at 75,356.
17. Id. §§ l1-030 to -035, at249-51.
18. 2 PHILIP R. WOOD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE SERIES:
COMPARATIVE LAW OF SECURITY INTERESTS AND TITLE FINANCE § 2-041, at 41 (2d ed. 2007).

19. I WOOD, supra note 4, § 11-035, at 251; Henri Pages & Jo~o A.C. Santos, Optimal
Supervisory Policies and Depositor-PreferenceLaws I n.2 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working
Paper No. 131, 2003), availableat http://www.bis.org/pubU work 13 l.pdf.
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depositor preference is not a protection against systemic runs: these tend
to start in the wholesale market.20 If a systemic collapse is on the way,
the protection of retail depositors will not do much to stop it. The objects
of depositor priority are generally to protect retail depositors (who have
votes) and in turn any deposit protection fund on subrogation after
payment to depositors. 2'
Most rescues require the injection of new money. 2 The issue here is
whether the new money should be prioritized over existing creditors. It is
generally accepted that last resort emergency money should have a
priority,23 although, if a rescue fails, existing creditors will be
subordinated. 24 Most leading bankruptcy regimes do not permit postcommencement new money to take priority over existing secured
creditors, either not at all or at least without adequate protection of the
secured creditors.2 5
There are pros and cons about the tax priority. A number of
countries have abolished the tax priority, at least in relation to ordinary
corporate insolvencies, for example, Switzerland (1996), Britain (2002),
Spain (2003), Portugal (2004), Sweden (2004), and Belgium (2009), but
not Italy, Japan, or the United States. 26
C. Rung 3: PariPassu Creditors
This group contains the true paripassu creditors upon liquidation.
Upon insolvency, they often receive nothing or a small percentage.27 The
largest of these creditors are often other banks and bondholders.2 8 Trade
creditors and real property lessors are proportionately small in the
normal case.29
A critical issue is the frequent need to be able to convert debtespecially for bank lenders and bondholders-into shares quickly so as
to restore the solvency of the debtor. This can be achieved by an agreed
debt-equity conversion or by a judicial plan or by the terms of the debt

20. 1 WOOD, supra note 4, § 24-015, at 735-36.
21. Id. §§ 24-015,-017, at735-36.
22. Id. § 23-109, at 718.
23. Id.
24. Seeid. §23-111,at719.
25. Id § 14-032, at 371.
26. See id. § 11-032, at 250; Tax Authorities and the Continuity of EnterprisesAct: Still No
Clarity, EUBEL1US (June 2011), http://www.eubelius.com/en/spotlight/tax-authorities-and the_
continuityof enterprises act still no clarity.
27. Id. § 11-059, at 266.
28. Id.
29. See id.
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instruments themselves. 30 A strong-arm bank resolution regime may
force a conversion: these forcible bail-ins were being widely discussed in
relation to banks in late 2010. 3 1 Contentious issues in forcible
conversions are whether shareholders should be disenfranchised in
regards to their control over new issues, pre-emption rights, and any
required approval of material disposals.3 2 The argument would be that
claimants who do not have a property right should not have a vote, but in
practice there are acute problems about valuation. For example, in the
financial crisis starting in 2007, bank valuations hinged upon the values
of homes which were very unpredictable.33
D. Rung 4: SubordinatedCreditors
All of the subordinated creditors and those below them generally
receive nothing upon liquidation because of the insolvency.34 The main
classes include:
(1) creditors who have voluntarily agreed to be subordinated,
such as junior bondholders providing hybrid capital. These
creditors may be divided into tiers, for example, senior
subordinated, junior subordinated, and preferred shares;
(2) creditors who are compulsorily subordinated in some
jurisdictions, for example,
35 for misconduct; and
(3) post-insolvency interest.
E. Rung 5: Equity Shareholders
The subordination of equity shareholders is critical to corporate
theory and the capital adequacy regimes for banks. Common
shareholders bear the first loss. 36 They know they bear the first loss and
they are compensated by increased returns, by the fact that profits go to
the bottom line, and by the possibility of capital appreciation.37 A key
30. Id. §2-001,at3l.
31. See, e.g., LISA CURRAN & JAAP WILLEUMIER, INT'L BAR ASS'N, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
available at
AND
NVCC
1
(2011),
G20
SURVEY
ON
BANK
BAIL-INS
http://www2.1se.ac.uk/fmg/events/conferences/2011/DBWorkshop_14Mar20 ll/6-IBASummary.
pdf, Tamara Burnell, Bail-in ProposalsAre Not Necessarily Bad for Investors-M&G, RISK.NET
(Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.risk.net/credit/opinion/2031415/bail-ins-necessarily-bad-investors.
32. See CURRAN & WILLEUMIER, supranote 31, at 4, 6.
33. Michael Legg & Jason Harris, How the American DreamBecame a Global Nightmare: An
Analysis of the Causes of the Global FinancialCrisis, 32 UNSW L.J. 350, 363-64 (2009).
34. 1 WOOD, supranote 4, § 11-062, at267.
35. Id. §§ 11-062 to -070, -072, at 267-71.
36. Id.§ 11-073,at271-72.
37. Id. §2-046, at47.
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issue is whether a shareholder induced by misrepresentation to subscribe
for shares can leapfrog up the rungs claiming damages, as in Australia.3 8
F. Rung 6: ExpropriatedCreditors
Typical expropriated creditors are claimants for foreign tax and
penalties who are typically excluded from claiming locally (although not
always).39 Often one of the largest classes of expropriated creditors is
composed of foreign currency creditors.4n Under the law of most
jurisdictions, foreign currency claims against the debtor are converted
into local currency at the commencement of the insolvency proceeding
in order to achieve parity. 4' The result is that, if the local currency
depreciates rapidly during a long-drawn-out insolvency, a foreign
currency creditor is similarly depreciated. 2 The conversion rule can
inflict considerable damage on foreign currency creditors.
The risk is particularly high if the sovereign state concerned is
bankrupt because the bankruptcy generally precipitates a sudden decline
in value of the currency of the sovereign state.4 3 Thus, in the case of the
insolvency of Argentina around 2002, foreign creditors claiming foreign
currency loans from Argentine corporate debtors were anxious to
prevent the formal bankruptcy of the corporate debtors since the
conversion would have inflicted massive losses in addition to the normal
bankruptcy losses.44
IV.

CONCLUSION

A precise description of the ladder in all of the jurisdictions of the
world would require a large and impenetrable treatise. As a very broad
generalization however, a key feature of the common law group of
jurisdictions, compared to the Napoleonic and Roman-Germanic groups,
is the super-priority accorded by the common law jurisdictions to the
three key risk mitigants: security interests, set-off, and trusts. They
therefore tend to be more protective of a certain class of claimants on
insolvency to the detriment of the rest.

Id. § 11-073, at271-72.
Id. §§ 11-074, -077, at 272-73.
Id. § 11-078, at 274.
Id.
Id.
Id.
44. See generally U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM., 108TH CONG., ARGENTINA'S ECONOMIC
CRISIS: CAUSES AND CURES (2003) (Rep. Jim Saxton), available at http://jec.senate.gov/
republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&File id=5fbf2f91-6cdf-4e70-8ff2-620ba9Olfc4c.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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The question of who ranks where on the bankruptcy ladder of
priorities is undoubtedly the issue which inflames the most passionate
debate. Whatever one may think of the various rationales advanced for
preferring one claimant over another, it would seem that the human
desire to arrange people in a hierarchy is deeply rooted. Even if the law
did not impose a hierarchy, one suspects that markets would devise
means of creating a ladder spontaneously. To queue is human. The real
questions are-is the ladder efficient? And is the ladder fair?
There are some more basic and primitive issues. Are we rational?
Or do we create legal systems which are mainly romantic? These same
questions also arise in relation to the famous paripassu clause.
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